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  ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether a two-sector small open economy real business 
cycle model calibrated to match Turkish data is able to account for the simultaneous 
sharp reversal in the current account, real exchange rate depreciation, and the severe 
recession observed in the aftermath of the 2001 financial and currency crisis of Turkey. 
Estimated shocks for the model’s eight exogenous variables are used to simulate model 
dynamics, and the resulting time series are compared to the actual series. The model 
does a fairly good job in matching the output drop, while it faces difficulty in matching 
the sharp real exchange rate depreciation. 
 
  JEL E32, F32 






  ÖZ Bu çalı mada Türkiye verisine uygun olarak ayarlanan iki sektörlü bir küçük açık 
ekonomi  reel  i   çevrimi  modelinin,  Türkiye’nin  2001  yılındaki  finansal  ve  döviz 
krizinin ardından  ya adığı e zamanlı cari i lemler düzeltmesi, para birimindeki reel 
değer kaybı ve  iddetli durgunluğu açıklamakta yeterli olup olmadığı ara tırılmaktadır. 
Modeldeki  sekiz  dı sal  deği ken  için  tahmin  edilen   oklar  modelin  dinamiklerini 
simüle  etmekte  kullanılmı   ve  elde  edilen  zaman  serileri  gerçek  serilerle 
kar ıla tırılmı tır. Model çıktıdaki dü ü ü yakalamada oldukça ba arılı olmakla birlikte 
para birimindeki keskin değer kaybını yakalamada güçlük çekmi tir. 
 
  TÜRKĐYE’NĐN 2001’DEKĐ DARALMASINI ĐKĐ-SEKTÖRLÜ BĐR Đ  ÇEVRĐMĐ MODELĐ AÇIKLAYABĐLĐR MĐ? 
JEL E32, F32 
  Anahtar Kelimeler Đ  çevrimleri, Türkiye 
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An important part of business cycle research agenda since the beginning 
of  2000s  has  been  directed  towards  accounting  for  the  differences  in 
business  cycle  characteristics  between  emerging  market  economies  and 
more advanced economies. Early research on business cycles in small open 
developed economies  highlights  the  importance  of  terms  of  trade  shocks 
(Mendoza, 1995), interest rate shocks (Mendoza, 1991; Correia et al., 1995), 
etc. As small open economies are not large enough to have an influence on 
world  prices,  exogenous  developments  in  these  prices  may  have 
considerable  impact  on  domestic  macroeconomic  fluctuations,  still, 
notwithstanding the dominant role played by productivity shocks. 
Early small open economy models laid the foundations towards recent 
studies on emerging market business cycles. For example, Neumeyer and 
Perri  (2005),  Uribe  and  Yue  (2006),  and  Tiryaki  (2010)  start  from  the 
observation that emerging markets are prone to paying a (risk) premium 
over the world interest rate in their borrowing contracts. The interaction of 
this  premium  (the  country  spread)  with  other  factors  such  as  the 
fundamentals of the economy or the world interest rates introduces a strong 
propagation mechanism. Moreover, a simple financial friction in the form of 
a working capital requirement also helps to strengthen the effect of interest 
rate fluctuations on the volatility of other macroeconomic variables. 
Using  a  two-sector  small  open  economy  real  business  cycle  model, 
Tiryaki  (2009)  examines  the  sources  of  macroeconomic  fluctuations  in 
Turkey, and provides an extensive analysis of the causes and propagation of 
business cycles in a setup which highlights the role of sectoral asymmetries 
and interactions. The primary finding of Tiryaki (2009) is that the prices of 
imported inputs and imported tradables are the two most important sources 
of fluctuations in Turkey. Productivity in the nontradable sector comes next 
as  an  important  factor  behind  the  fluctuations  in  most  of  the  quantity 
variables.  Tradable  sector  productivity,  on  the  other  hand,  plays  a  more 
significant role in the determination of relative prices, such as the relative 
price  of  the  consumption  good  and  the  real  exchange  rate.  The  model 
generates  significant  asymmetry  in  the  impulse  responses  of  sectoral 
variables.  The  performance  of  the  model  in  matching  business  cycle 
moments is reasonably good. The model also shows that variable capital 
utilization  acts  as  a  strong  amplification  mechanism,  especially  in  the  
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tradable sector, and reduces the reliance on productivity shocks. Another 
finding  with  important  policy  consequences  is  that  the  effect  of  liability 
dollarization  operates  mainly  through  the  tradable  sector.  The  effect  of 
imported  tradables  price  shocks  is  amplified  strongly  and  the  tradable 
sector’s output volatility rises significantly with liability dollarization. 
The main objective of this study is to account for the 2001 recession of 
Turkey using the business cycle model of Tiryaki (2009). The financial and 
currency crisis of Turkey in 2001 provides us with an environment to take 
the model to an informal test. We will have a closer look at the collapse of 
Turkey’s exchange-rate-based stabilization plan in 2001 in the next section. 
We aim to see whether the model can account for the observed evolution of 
main variables after the crisis. Specifically, we address the question that to 
what extent the observed sharp reversal in current account, real exchange 
rate depreciation, and output drops are explained by the model. 
One of the central goals of macroeconomics is to understand the sources 
of aggregate fluctuations. Business cycle models, in general, provide the 
policymakers with insight into the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations 
and the transmission channels of various shocks through the economy. The 
question asked in the paper is whether a two-sector “real” business cycle 
model  can  account  for  the  2001  recession  (not  “crisis”)
1;  and  the  paper 
identifies some “real” shocks as having non-negligible influence on Turkish 
business cycles in general and on the 2001 recession in particular. The paper 
offers  the  policymaker  a  set  of  results  which  is  obtained  from  a 
computational experiment carried out using a coherent model structure and 
parameterization  representative  of  the  key  characteristics  of  the  Turkish 
economy. 
Nonetheless, there are some macroeconomic policy-related issues that are 
left out in the analysis and that may have been affected the performance of 
the  model.  For  example,  the  restructuring  of  the  banking  sector  by  the 
government  and  the  consequent  fiscal  adjustment both  have  implications 
also for the recession and the eventual recovery; or adopting the floating 
exchange rate regime after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime 
implies a very different monetary policy environment. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The model has no intention to explain the making of the 2001 crisis, nor does it have the appropriate 
structure to deal with such an ambition. The crisis, which was ultimately a financial one, was incorporated in 
the model through the exogenous shocks. For example, the devaluation of the Turkish lira is reflected on the 
relative prices of imported tradable goods and imported inputs, while the impact of the banking sector crisis 
can be found in the country risk premium.  
    T Ti ir ry ya ak ki i   | |   C Ce en nt tr ra al l   B Ba an nk k   R Re ev vi ie ew w   1 11 1( (1 1) ): :2 29 9- -4 41 1   
   
3 32 2   
2. A Brief Account of the 2001 Turkish Crisis 
In this section, we discuss the evolution of the Turkish economy towards 
the collapse of the exchange-rate-based stabilization plan which started in 
January 2000.
2 The main pillar of the stabilization plan had been a pre-set 
rate of daily depreciation for 18 months announced in advance. After the 
initial 18 months, Turkish lira was planned to fluctuate within a gradually 
widening  band,  eventually  starting  to  float  freely  following  the  latter  18 
months of the plan. The pressure on the Turkish lira has become enormous 
only after 13 months, and the lira had to be set afloat in February 2001. The 
result was a very severe recession of output. Gross domestic product shrank 
by 5.7 percent in 2001; current account turned from a deficit of 4.9 percent 
of GDP in 2000 to a surplus of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2001; trade-weighted 
CPI-based real exchange rate depreciated by 18 percent in 2001 over the 
previous year in which the real exchange rate appreciated by 11 percent. 
At the outset of the stabilization plan, January 2000, real interest rates 
came  down  very  rapidly  owing  to  optimistic  expectations  and  sizeable 
amount  of  IMF  lending.  Easing  of  borrowing  conditions  led  to  a 
consumption and investment boom, also stimulating imports. Coupled with 
rising  crude  oil  prices,  this  boom  paved  the  way  for  an  increase  in  the 
current account deficit. Growing current account deficit, in turn, added to 
the  fragility  of  the  Turkish  economy  stemming  from  the  weak  banking 
sector overexposed to both maturity and currency mismatches. Turkish lira 
was continuously becoming stronger in real terms because of the inertia in 
domestic inflation under the pre-announced crawling peg regime. 
Figures 1 and 2 plot time series of relevant aggregates and prices for the 
period  1998-2006.  All  series  are  in  log  scale  and  detrended  using  the 
Hodrick-Prescott  filter,  except,  capacity  utilization  and  interest  rate 
components are filtered in levels. Figure 1 illustrates clearly the initial boom 
in  GDP  in  2000,  and  the  collapse  following  the  February  2001  crisis 
(indicated by the vertical dashed line in figures). Notice that tradable sector 
output falls by almost twice as much as the fall in nontradable output. Both 
labour  hours  and  capacity  utilization  in  the  tradable  sector  fell  sharply 
during the crisis. Labour hours in the nontradable sector did not initially 
react, only to catch up by the end of the year. 
Imports of both final goods and intermediate goods also fell significantly 
as  the  demand  for  consumption  and  investment  went  down.  The  large 
decrease in domestic absorption created the strong reversal in the current 
account. 
                                                 
2 Descriptive and analytical studies on the Turkish crisis of 2001 are Alper (2001), Özatay and Sak (2002), 
Akyüz and Boratav (2003), and Özkan (2005), among others.  
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The price of imports relative to the price of nontradable goods rose. Also 
imported inputs became more expensive, partly due to the coincident rise in 
crude oil prices. Terms of trade did not change that much because export 
prices followed a similar pattern to that of import prices. Real exchange rate 
depreciated sharply. Notice also the symmetry between real exchange rate 
and import prices. 
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Net exports / GDP
Note: All series are in log scale and Hodrick-Prescott filtered,
except for capital utilization series, which is filtered in levels.
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Country spread (EMBI)
Note: All series are in log scale and Hodrick-Prescott filtered,
except for interest rate and spread series, which are filtered in levels.
 
3. Model and Methodology 
The  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium  model  of  Tiryaki  (2009) 
builds on the stylized two-sector neoclassical small open economy business 
cycle  model  by  enriching  the  transmission  mechanism  along  several 
directions.  There  are  two  sectors  in  the  economy:  nontradable  goods 
producing  sector  and  tradable  goods  producing  sector.  Domestically 
produced  tradable  goods  and  imported  tradable  goods  are  combined  to 
obtain  the  final  composite  tradable  good  using  a  constant  elasticity  of 
substitution  aggregator.  Then,  this  composite  tradable  good  is  combined 
with the nontradable good to obtain the final composite good. 
Stochastic  shocks  are  transmitted  and  propagated  through  various 
channels including variable capital utilization, imported intermediate goods, 
working capital requirement, capital adjustment cost, bond adjustment cost, 
asymmetries in factor shares of production in the two sectors, asymmetries 
in  the  composition  of  final  expenditure  groups,  and  lastly,  liability 
dollarization.  There  are  eight  exogenous  variables  driving  the  model 
dynamics:  demand  for  imports  in  the  rest  of  the  world,  productivity  in 
tradable and nontradable sectors, government expenditure, relative prices of 
both intermediate and final goods imports, world interest rate, and country 
spreads. They are subject to stochastic shocks and assumed to follow AR(1) 
processes.  Detailed  description  and  calibration  of  the  model,  and  the  
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solution of the log-linearized system of equations are described in Tiryaki 
(2009) and available from the author upon request. 
Given that the 2001 crisis was a banking and currency crisis, the country 
spread rate and the real exchange in the model capture different aspects of 
the linkage between the financial and real sectors. Exogenous fluctuations in 
the country spread account for most of the variation in real interest rates; and 
they are transmitted to firms’ production decision through the cost of capital 
channel  and  the  working  capital  channel,  and  also  transmitted  to  the 
household’s decisions through the standard consumption smoothing channel. 
As  for  the  real  exchange  rate,  exogenous  fluctuations  in  the  nominal 
exchange rate are reflected in the real exchange rate to the extent that they 
change import prices relative to the prices of domestically produced goods 
and services. 
In this study, we take the model’s eight exogenous variables and estimate 
their law of motion equations and the resulting shock terms. We then feed 
these shocks to the model’s equations in order to obtain model’s predictions 
of the behaviour of output, current account, and real exchange rate during 
the 2001 recession. These three variables constitute the basic stylized facts 
studied  in  the  literature  on  sudden  stop  episodes  in  emerging  market 
economies. Evidence on sudden stop episodes indicates simultaneous real 
exchange  rate  depreciation,  significant  output  drops,  and  reversal  of  the 
current  account.  It  is  also  possible  to  view  these  three  variables  as  a 
summary  of  the  overall  economy.  Output  represents  domestic  balance, 
current account represents external balance (or, equivalently, the domestic 
savings  investment  balance),  and  the  real  exchange  rate  represents  the 
adjustment  between  internal  and  external  balance  to  maintain  general 
equilibrium. 
4. Evaluation of Model-Based Time Series after the Crisis 
In  this  section,  we  discuss  the  model’s  ability  to  replicate  key 
observations during the Turkish crisis in 2001. The focus of the analysis will 
be  whether  the  model  is  able  to  predict  simultaneously  a  prolonged 
contraction  in  GDP,  real  exchange  rate  depreciation,  and  sharp  current 
account reversal following the crisis period. 
In the first quarter of 2001, when the exchange-rate-based stabilization 
programme collapsed in February, we observed coincident positive shocks 
to  the  prices  of  imported  tradables  and  imported  inputs  in  the  order  of 
approximately 2 standard deviations, and negative shocks to productivity in 
both  sectors  in  the  order  of  approximately  2  standard  deviations,  and  a 
positive shock to the country spread component of real interest rate in the 
order of approximately 1.5 standard deviations.  
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In Figures 3, 4, and 5, we plot, respectively, the evolution of GDP, net 
exports to GDP ratio, and real exchange rate before and after the collapse of 
the exchange-rate-based stabilization programme, as well as the predictions 
of the baseline model, given the values of estimated shocks. The first plot in 
each figure presents the combined effect of all shocks; the second plot in the 
first rows plots the combined effect of all shocks except shock to the price of 
imported tradables; while the third plot shows the isolated effect of imported 
tradables price shock. The plot on the left hand side of the second row in 
figures  shows  the  prediction  of  the  baseline  model  when  there  are  only 
sectoral productivity shocks in the model. The middle plot in the second row 
shows the prediction when there is only country spread shock;
3 and the plot 
on the right hand side of the bottom row shows the prediction when there is 
only imported inputs price shock. 
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According  to  model’s  predictions,  all  shocks,  except  for  the  positive 
imported tradables price shock, that occurred in the first quarter of 2001 
worked  in  contractionary  direction  (Figure  3).  The  positive  2-standard-
deviation shock to imported tradable price, on the other hand, predicts a 
counterfactually strong, export-driven output boom. This is due to the excess 
sensitivity  of  the  impulse  response  of  tradables  output  to  imports  price 
shocks, which is significantly at odds with the expected response that could 
                                                 
3 Notice that the model-based series in this plot are shown in two scales (left and right). In the left scale, the 
model-based series are drawn at the same scale as the actual series. Yet, the variation caused by only country 
spread shocks is so small that we draw the model-based series also in the right scale in order to show the 
correlation between model-based and actual series.  
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be  reconciled  with  the  data.  Excluding  this  effect  but  keeping  all  other 
shocks, the model predicts a sharper collapse in output in the first quarter of 
2001, followed by a relatively sluggish recovery. Even productivity shocks 
alone predict a dramatic collapse of output in the wake of the crisis. 
The impact of the anomaly regarding the economy’s response to imported 
tradables  price  shock  can  also  be  seen  in  Table  1,  which  shows  the 
correlation  coefficients  between  actual  and  model-based  series  under 
different  shock  combinations.  For  example,  the  model  with  all  shocks 
produces a correlation coefficient of 0.63 between actual and model-based 
output series, whereas the model with all shocks except imported tradables 
price shock produces a correlation coefficient of 0.81. The country spread 
shock and the imported inputs price shock also lead to a fall in output when 
considered in isolation, yet these shocks cannot generate sufficiently strong 
responses in order to account for almost 8 percent fall in output. However, 
as shown in Table 1, the correlation between model-based and actual series 
is quite high even when we consider each shock in isolation. 
 
Table 1. Correlations between Actual and Model-Implied Series 
  ρ(y,y*)  ρ(nxy,nxy*)  ρ(rer,rer*) 
All shocks  0.630  0.490  0.677 
All except imported tradables price shock  0.807  -0.195  -0.191 
Only imported tradables price shock  -0.728  0.743  0.569 
Only productivity shocks  0.695  0.608  -0.309 
Only country spread shock  0.801  0.727  0.056 
Only imported inputs price shock  0.652  0.636  -0.095 
 
Movements in the net exports/GDP ratio are best tracked by shocks to 
imports price and country spread. Nonetheless, neither shock is perfectly 
able to lead to a reversal in the current account balance as sharp as observed 
in the data (Figure 4). The model predicts too small variability even when 
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The structure of the model as a small open economy leads us to take 
foreign  prices  as  determined  exogenously  (for  tradables)  or  as  given 
constants (for nontradables). Therefore, real exchange rate movements are 
caused, to a large extent, by movements in exogenous variables. As it is, the 
model fails to produce as sharp real exchange rate depreciation as in data;  
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and,  a  large  part  of  depreciation  came  from  the  shock  to  the  price  of 
imported tradables (Figure 5). 
The  financial  and  currency  crisis  brought  about  a  wide  set  of  policy 
responses to transform the economy; and these policy responses, which are 
excluded  in  the  model,  may  have  been  affected  the  performance  of  the 
model.  Main  policy  responses  to  the  crisis  were  (i)  the  banking  sector 
restructuring and the resulting surge in public debt, (ii) almost a decade-long 
fiscal  adjustment  (primary  surpluses),  (iii)  adoption  of  floating  exchange 
rate and inflation targeting regimes, (iv) microeconomic policy reforms and 
privatizations. Some of these policy changes can be traced in exogenous 
shocks,  while  others  may  not  be  captured  at  all.  For  example,  some 
economists argue that the effect of the fiscal consolidation during most of 
the 2000s has been expansionary rather than being contractionary.
4 Fiscal 
consolidation,  the  argument  goes,  decreases  the  risk  of  default  by  the 
government, thereby reducing the risk premium. This mechanism is captured 
in the model by exogenous country spread shocks. As for microeconomic 
policy  reforms  and  privatizations,  one  may  argue  that  they  increase 
productivity, which is also captured in the model. Floating exchange rate 
regime made it possible for the nominal exchange rate to adjust in order to 
reach equilibrium, whereas, previously other  variables, such as the wage 
rate, among others, had to adjust to reach equilibrium. Moreover, there is 
evidence that exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices has weakened 
considerably with the inflation targeting regime (Kara and Öğünç, 2008). 
The model abstracts from elements such as monopolistic competition, local 
currency pricing, or pricing to market, therefore the model is lacking an 
endogenous pricing behaviour, which may have significantly influenced the 
ability of the model to replicate the time series of the real exchange rate. 
5. Conclusion 
We carried out an exercise in order to assess whether a two-sector small 
open economy real business cycle model can replicate the 2001 recession of 
Turkey.  We  used  the  model  of  Tiryaki  (2009)  in  which  propagation  of 
shocks  is  through  various  channels  including  variable  capital  utilization, 
imported  intermediate  goods,  working  capital  requirement,  capital 
adjustment cost, bond adjustment cost, and liability dollarization. The model 
is  calibrated  such  that  it  represents  the  main  features  of  the  Turkish 
economy. 
The financial and currency crisis of 2001 was characterized by sizeable 
shocks in the order of approximately 1.5 to 2 standard deviations to the 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Özatay (2008).  
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imported tradables price, imported inputs price, productivity in tradable and 
nontradable sectors, and country spread component of the real interest rate. 
These  exogenous  variables  also  account  for  a  great majority  of  business 
cycle volatility. 
When all of the shocks are used in simulation, the model predicts the fall 
in output by a close margin, but it is followed by an export-driven rebound 
in output after two quarters. This is due to the model’s excess sensitivity in 
the response of the economy to imported tradables price shocks. When the 
imported tradables price shock is excluded, the model yields more realistic 
time series for output. We also found that movements in the net exports/ 
GDP  ratio  are  best  tracked  by  shocks  to  import  prices  and  the  country 
spread.  However,  the  model  faces  difficulty  in  matching  the  sharp  real 
exchange rate depreciation. 
One implication for policymakers is that the relative prices of imported 
tradable  goods  and  imported  inputs  have  nontrivial  consequences  on 
business cycles in Turkey. However, as the model generates counterfactually 
strong response of the tradable output to imported tradables price shock, it is 
likely that the importance of the imported tradables price shock is somewhat 
exaggerated. Therefore, future models should aim to explain the anomaly 
that  the  standard  export  demand  equation  generates  much  stronger 
expenditure switching effect than what could be reconciled with actual data. 
Country spread shocks alone generate model-based series for output and 
current  account  that  have  quite  high  correlation  with  actual  time  series. 
However, in the current form of the model, country spreads are hardly the 
major  cause  of  business cycles  in  terms  of  magnitudes.  Model’s  lack of 
amplification power of the country spread shocks, in spite of its ability to 
generate high correlation between the model-based and actual time series, 
seems  to  suggest  that  the  model  needs  to  be  augmented  with  additional 
amplification  mechanisms  that  specifically  address  the  role  of  country 
spreads. 
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